Whether Section 6A of the DSPE Act is part of procedure or it introduces a conviction or sentence?

Whether Article 20 (1) of the Constitution will have any bearing or relevance in the context of declaration of Section 6 A of the DSPE Act as unconstitutional?

 The declaration of Section 6A of the DSPE Act as unconstitutional and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution would have a retrospective effect or would apply prospectively from the date of its declaration as unconstitutional? Or whether there can be a deprivation of immunity provided under Section 6A (1) of DSPE Act 1946 by a retrospective operation of a judgment (SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY) of constitution bench, in the context of Article 20 of the Constitution of India?

If a writ under Article 226 is decided on merits and dismissed, decision will continue to survive until same is reversed or modified by an appeal or other appropriate proceedings permissible;

If writ is dismissed not on merits but on ground of laches or that alternative remedy is available will not attract plea of res judicata as the court has not applied its mind and matter not decided on merits, a speaking order is necessary to establish the essentials of res judicata;

Rule of res judicata bar another writ under Article 32 on the on the same facts to claim same relief;

Writ dismissed under Article 226 in limine there res judicata will not be operative if the order is not passed on merits or there is no speaking order at all passed by the court;

1. The scope and ambit of power and jurisdiction of this Court under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India;
2. Depending upon the findings of this bench on the first question, whether this Court, while hearing a transfer petition, or in any other proceedings, can exercise power under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India, in view of the settlement between the parties, and grant a decree of divorce by mutual consent dispensing with the period and the procedure prescribed under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, and also quash and dispose of other/connected proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, or criminal prosecution primarily under Section 498-A and other provisions of the Penal Code, 1860. If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, in which cases and under what circumstances should this Court exercise jurisdiction under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India is an ancillary issue to be decided; and
3. Whether this Court can grant divorce in exercise of power under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India when there is complete and irretrievable breakdown of marriage in spite of the other spouse opposing the prayer.

This court held that learned single judge wrongly applied Saumya Chaurasia v. Directorate of Enforcement (2024) 6 SCC 401 wherein court observed that category of persons added in section 45 (1) proviso should be dealt more sympathetically reason being such persons are likely to be more vulnerable and may sometimes be misused for committing such crimes.

Considering the finding of Saumya Chaurasia (supra) this court observed in present case in para 27 that finding of the said case does not mean that section 45(1) proviso only includes “vulnerable women”. Moreover only because women is highly educated that does not mean she is not entitled to the benefit under section 45(1) proviso.

In Har Naraini Devi and Another vs. Union of India and Others, an order of the division bench was assailed by filing an appeal before the apex court on the ground that section 50 of Delhi Land Reforms, 1954 (hereinafter referred as DLR Act) being ultra vires to Article 14, 15, 21 & 254 of the Constitution. The significant issue in the present case was controversy regarding the applicability of the Delhi Land Reform Act, 1954 and the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 on any inheritance that accrued before the amendment of Hindu Succession in 2005.

“Whether Section 50 of the DLR Act has been repealed by the Amendment Act inasmuch as by omitting Section 4(2) of the HSA, 1956, it has removed the immunity that the DLR Act had with respect to the laws of succession in respect of agricultural land? Also, if that be the case, do the petitioners, being female, now have the right to succeed to the disputed agricultural land?”